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450 South State Street, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140210 
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Re: State v. Rhinehart, Case No. 20050635-SC 
Utah R. App. P. 24(j) Supplemental Authority Letter 
Dear Ms. Bartholomew: 
Pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State cites State v. 
Norris, 2007 UT 5, in support of Point II, pages 19-30, of the State's brief. Norris was 
issued by this Court on January 19, 2007, after the State filed its brief. A copy of Norris is 
attached for the Court's convenience. 
The State also cites State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517, ^ 11-18, in support of 
Point II.C, pages 30-31, of the State's brief. This court of appeals' decision was also issued 
after the State filed its brief and is an appeal of this defendant from a related burglary 
conviction. A copy of Rhinehart is also attached for the Court's convenience. 
I would appreciate it you would distribute this letter and attachments to the Court. 
The case is not yet set for oral argument. 
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Richard F. Norris, 
Defendant, Petitioner, 
and Cross-Respondent. 
Fourth District, Provo Dep't 
The Honorable James R. Taylor 
No. 981403794 
Attorneys: Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., E. Neal Gunnarson, 
Jeffrey S. Gray, Christine F. Soltis, Asst. 
Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
Jennifer K. Gowans, Provo, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice: 
[^l The defendant, Richard Norris, challenges the 
constitutionality of the Communications Fraud statute, Utah Code 
section 76-10-1801, as overbroad. Specifically, he seeks review 
of the decision of the court of appeals holding that the statute 
is constitutional. 
f2 The State cross-petitions, seeking reversal of the 
decision of the court of appeals that an unconditional guilty 
plea does not waive a defendant's appellate challenge to the 
facial constitutionality of the statute under which the defendant 
was charged.1 
F I L E D 
J a n u a r y 19 , 2 0 07 
1
 State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, 97 P.3d 732. 
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H3 Because we reverse, holding that an unconditional 
guilty plea does waive a defendant's right to challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute, we do not reach the other issues 
presented. 
f4 Review of the specific facts leading to the charges 
against the defendant are not necessary for the resolution of 
this matter. The defendant was originally charged with seven 
counts of communications fraud. The State amended the 
information, and the defendant was ultimately tried on five 
counts of communications fraud. 
f5 After three days of trial, the defendant elected to 
change his plea and entered an unconditional guilty plea to three 
counts of communications fraud. All are third degree felonies. 
16 The defendant made no attempt to withdraw his 
unconditional guilty plea. He did, however, timely file an 
appeal. The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the convictions. We 
granted certiorari to review the correctness of that action. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
%1 On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 
appeals and not the decision of the trial court.2 "The 
determination of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction 
is a question of law, which we review for correctness."3 
ANALYSIS 
[^8 In order to reach the issues of overbreadth and 
vagueness, the court of appeals initially addressed the question 
of whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to review the 
conviction on appeal once the defendant had entered an 
unconditional guilty plea. The court of appeals4 found that a 
facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is 
jurisdictional in nature and that, therefore, an unconditional 
2
 State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). 
3
 Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, H 8, 31 P.3d 
1147. 
4
 Each of the court of appeals judges who sat on the panel 
wrote his own separate opinion. The majority felt that a 
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute could not be 
waived. The remaining judge felt that this could be waived and 
that subject matter jurisdiction was therefore lacking. 
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guilty plea could not act as a waiver or bar to raising this 
claim for the first time on appeal. We disagree. 
f9 An unconditional guilty plea waives any right the 
defendant may have had to challenge the basis of his conviction 
on its merits. The defendant's effort to describe the 
constitutional challenge he raises as a challenge to the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the district court is simply without merit 
as a tool for appealing the conviction after the plea has been 
entered and the sentence imposed. The court of appeals lacked 
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The opinion of the court 
of appeals is vacated, and the judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
flO Chief Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish, 
and Justice Nehring concur in Associate Chief Justice Wilkins' 
opinion. 
3 No. 20040880 
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State v. RhinehartUtah App.,2006. 
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN 
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE 
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL 
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Tamara RHINEHART, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20050553-CA. 
Dec. 29,2006. 
First District, Logan Department, 031101017; The 
Honorable Gordon J. Low. 
David M. Perry, Logan, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Erin Riley, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee. 
Before Judges GREENWOOD, BILLINGS, and 
McHUGH. 
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge: 
*1 H 1 Defendant Tamara Rhinehart was convicted 
after a jury trial of burglary, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code section 76-6-202, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (2003), and theft, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
section 76-6-404. See id. § 76-6-202 (2003). She 
appeals from the (1) denial of her motion to quash 
bindover, (2) overruling of her objection to the 
order of trials, and (3) overruling of her objection to 
the use of hearsay evidence at trial. We affirm.FN1 
FNL Defendant also raises claims 
regarding a motion for new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence. We do not 
address Defendant's claim that her motion 
for new trial should have been granted 
because it was inadequately briefed. See 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 
(Utah 1998) ("It is well established that an 
appellate court will decline to consider an 
argument that a party has failed to 
adequately brief."). Likewise, we do not 
address Defendant's newly discovered 
evidence argument because Defendant fails 
to identify any newly discovered evidence 
or discuss how it would have advanced her 
defense at trial. See id. 
BACKGROUND FN2 
FN2. "When reviewing a challenge to a 
criminal conviction, 'we recite the facts 
from the record ... in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict.' " State v. 
Lee, 2006 UT 5,<ff 2, 128 P .3d 1179 
(omission in original) (quoting State v. 
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT I6,1f 2, 86 P.3d 
742). 
T| 2 Sometime after June 5, 2003, Defendant and 
her boyfriend, Craig Nicholls, stole a safe belonging 
to Defendant's aunt, Sue Davis. Davis kept the safe, 
which contained approximately $6500, in her 
apartment. To accomplish the theft, Defendant lured 
Davis out of her home while Nicholls stole the safe. 
During roughly the same time period, Defendant 
told her hair dresser, Marne Christianson, that she 
and Nicholls stole a safe containing $5000, that 
Nicholls stole it from someone's house after 
Defendant had lured the owner out of the home, and 
that they dumped the safe in a parking lot after 
cracking it open. Defendant also told Jessica 
Goalen, a nanny who she employed, that she and 
Nicholls stole a safe containing a large sum of 
money, that the theft was "just like [the film] The 
Italian Job" in that it was "really slick ... [i]n and 
out," and that Defendant and Nicholls cracked the 
safe open and then left it in a field. 
\ 3 The facts surrounding the theft and burglary 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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came to light while Defendant and Nicholls were 
being investigated for a related charge of murder. 
Nicholls pleaded guilty to the murder in exchange 
for a sentence of life without parole. The State 
agreed to drop any remaining charges against 
Nicholls, and he agreed to "fully cooperate with the 
State in their prosecution of [his] co-defendant, 
Tamara Rhinehart ... by truthfully disclosing all 
aspects of [their] planning and carrying out" the 
murder. During a subsequent police interview that 
was primarily focused on the murder charge, 
Nicholls briefly discussed his and Defendant's 
participation in the burglary and theft. Nicholls told 
police that he and Defendant devised a plan 
whereby Defendant would take Davis out to eat, 
and while they were gone, Nicholls would steal 
Davis's safe. 
\ 4 The police charged Defendant with burglary, 
theft, and murder. At Defendant's preliminary 
hearing on all of the charges, Nicholls invoked his 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 
and was therefore unavailable to testify. The State 
then presented into evidence the transcript of 
Nicholls's police interview as evidence of 
Defendant's role in the crimes charged. The State 
also introduced a sworn statement from Davis and a 
transcript of a telephone interview with 
Christians on. There was no other evidence 
introduced at the preliminary hearing to implicate 
Defendant in the burglary and theft charges. 
\ 5 Defendant was bound over on all charges and 
subsequently requested severance of the charges for 
trial. Defendant also moved to quash the bindover 
on grounds that hearsay was wrongly admitted at 
the preliminary hearing. The trial court agreed to 
sever the burglary and theft charges from the 
murder charge, but denied Defendant's motion to 
quash. Defendant also moved to have the burglary 
and theft trial held after the murder trial. However, 
that motion was denied. 
*2 \ 6 During the burglary and theft trial, defense 
counsel asked the investigating officer, Detective 
Bennett, on cross-examination whether he spoke to 
anyone about the existence of the missing safe: " 
You never determined that there is another person 
on this planet that ever saw a safe in the possession 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
Page 2 
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of Sue Davis, correct?" Detective Bennett 
responded, "Correct." On re-direct examination, the 
prosecutor asked several follow up questions: 
Q. Did you talk to Craig Nicholls about a safe? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did he tell you anything that would lead you to 
believe whether or not Sue Davis had a safe? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was that? 
A. Well, at the time he described the area that he 
had gone to to retrieve the safe. 
Q. And what did he describe? 
A. He described coming into the valley.... He 
described the Sear's store which is located down by 
Macey's at the south end of Logan.... He described 
that he was to go into a home because there was an 
aunt of Tam[a]ra Rhinehart who possessed a safe 
with some money in that safe. That he would go 
into that home to take that safe out while Tam[a]ra 
Rhinehart took the family members to lunch or 
dinner. 
\ 7 Defense counsel objected to Detective 
Bennett's response on grounds that it contained 
hearsay, but the trial court overruled the objection, 
accepting the State's argument that defense counsel 
had opened the door to the testimony. At the 
conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Defendant 
on both counts. Defendant subsequently moved for 
a new trial. That motion was denied. Defendant now 
appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
\ 8 Defendant claims that the trial court should 
have granted her motion to quash the bindover 
because hearsay evidence was improperly permitted 
at the preliminary hearing. The determination of 
whether to bind a defendant over for trial generally 
involves a mixed question of law and fact, which 
requires this court to afford some deference to the 
trial court. See State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29,U 26, 
137 P.3d 787. However, when a case presents only 
a question of law, namely whether hearsay used at 
the preliminary hearing was admissible under 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), or 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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reliable under rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, this court will review the bindover 
determination for correctness giving no deference to 
the trial court. See State v. Graham, 2006 UT 43,\ 
16 n. 7, 558 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. 
\ 9 Defendant also argues that the trial court erred 
in refusing to hold the murder trial before the 
burglary and theft trial. We review a claim 
regarding the administration of a trial court's docket 
for abuse of discretion. See Walker Drug Co. v. 
LaSal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1244 (Utah 1998) (" 
Rule 42(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
gives the trial court 'considerable discretion' to 
administer the business of its docket and determine 
how a trial should be conducted."); Morton v. 
Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 
1997) ("A trial judge is given a great deal of 
latitude in determining the most fair and efficient 
manner to conduct court business."). 
*3 U 10 Finally, Defendant argues that hearsay 
evidence should not have been allowed at trial 
because it was prejudicial and the trial court 
incorrectly ruled that the "door had been opened." " 
Our standard of review on the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence is complex, since the 
determination of admissibility 'often contains a 
number of rulings, each of which may require a 
different standard of review.' " State v. Workman, 
2005 UT 66,U 10, 122 P.3d 639 (quoting Norman 
H. Jackson, Utah Standards of Appellate Review, 
12 Utah Bar J. 8, 38 (1999)). Legal questions 
regarding admissibility are reviewed for 
correctness, and questions of fact are reviewed for 
clear error. See id. And, "[fjinally, we review the 
district court's ruling on admissibility for abuse of 
discretion." Id. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover 
K 11 Defendant argues that the trial court should 
have granted her motion to quash the bindover 
because the State presented inadmissible hearsay at 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
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the preliminary hearing, and without the hearsay, 
there would have been no evidence to support a 
finding of probable cause. See State v. Virgin, 2006 
UT 29,H 17, 137 P.3d 787 (holding that at a 
preliminary hearing, the State must establish 
probable cause with "evidence sufficient to support 
a reasonable belief that the defendant committed the 
charged crime"). Specifically, Defendant claims 
that hearsay should not have been allowed at her 
preliminary hearing because Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, see U.S. Const, amend. VI, XIV; 
Article I Sections 12 and 13 of the Utah Constitution 
, see Utah Const, art. I, §§ 12-13; and "due process 
rights both federal and state in origin" provide 
criminal defendants with the right to confront and 
cross-examine the witnesses against them at 
preliminary hearings. In the alternative, Defendant 
argues that hearsay should not have been admitted 
at her preliminary hearing because it was unreliable 
and, therefore, inadmissible under Article I Section 
12 of the state constitution or rule 1102 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. See Utah Const, art. I, § 12; 
UtahR.Evid. 1102. 
A. Whether Crawford Applies at Preliminary 
Hearings 
% 12 The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution 
states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him...." U.S. Const, amend. VI. 
This provision, also known as the "Confrontation 
Clause," was recently the focus of the United States 
Supreme Court decision, Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004). There, the Court held that 
testimonial statements by witnesses absent at trial 
may only be admitted if the declarant is unavailable 
and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant. See id. at 59, 68. 
Although the Supreme Court in Crawford provided 
an exhaustive discussion of the Confrontation 
Clause, in contrast to Defendant's argument, it never 
indicated that it applies at preliminary hearings. See 
id. at 42-69. 
*4 | 13 Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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previously explained that the Confrontation Clause 
provides a trial right, not a pre-trial right. For 
example, in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 
(1987), a plurality of the Court stated that "the right 
to confrontation is a trial right, designed to prevent 
improper restrictions on the types of questions that 
defense counsel may ask during cross-examination." 
Id. at 52 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 
157 (1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 
(1968)). And, in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 
(1975), the Court explained that cross-examination 
is "not essential for the probable cause 
determination" that is the focus of the preliminary 
hearing. Id. at 121; see also State v. Pledger, 896 
P.2d 1226, 1228 n. 4 (Utah 1995) (interpreting 
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120-22). Although 
confrontation and cross-examination may enhance 
the reliability of the probable cause determination, 
the Supreme Court explained that "their value 
would be too slight to justify holding, as a matter of 
constitutional principle, that these formalities and 
safeguards designed for trial must also be employed 
in making the Fourth Amendment determination of 
probable cause." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123. 
K 14 Although Utah has not specifically addressed 
whether hearsay is admissible at preliminary 
hearings post-Crawford, other jurisdictions have, 
and they have reached the same conclusion that we 
do today. See, eg., People v. Felder, 129 P.3d 
1072, 1073 (Colo.Ct.App.2005) (concluding that 
the right to confrontation is a trial right, and " 
[n]othing in Crawford suggests that the Supreme 
Court intended to alter" this conclusion); State v. 
Woinarowicz, 720 N.W.2d 635, 641 (N.D.2006) (" 
[The] Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is a 
trial right, which does not apply to pretrial 
suppression hearings."). The Confrontation Clause 
pertains to a criminal defendant's right to confront 
and cross-examine the witnesses against the 
defendant at trial; it does not afford the right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses at a 
preliminary hearing, and Crawford does not alter 
the Court's previous holdings with respect to this 
matter. Consequently, we are not persuaded by 
Defendant's argument that Crawford requires 
application of the Confrontation Clause at 
preliminary hearings.FN3 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
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FN3. Our conclusion is strengthened by 
the fact that the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
which are constrained by the limits of the 
Constitution, see Fed.R.Evid. 802, 
expressly allow for the introduction of 
hearsay at preliminary hearings. See id. 
1101(d) ("The rules [of evidence] do not 
apply [at] Preliminary Examinations in 
Criminal Cases."). 
B. Whether State law Provides the Right to 
Confrontation at Preliminary Hearings 
Tf 15 Defendant relies on State v. Anderson, 612 
P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), for the proposition that the 
right to confrontation exists at preliminary hearings 
under state law. In Anderson, the Utah Supreme 
Court acknowledged the "critical character" of the 
preliminary hearing and thus held that the 
Confrontation Clause applies. See id. at 785-86. 
However, this decision was expressly abrogated 
first, by amendment to Article I, Section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution,FN4 see Utah Const, art. I, § 12, 
and subsequently, by rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence.™5 See Utah R. Evid. 1102 advisory 
committee's note ("To the extent that State v. 
Anderson prohibited the use of hearsay at 
preliminary examinations, that case has been 
abrogated.").™6 Defendant argues that rule 1102 
is invalid because Crawford supersedes the state's 
evidence rules-and that under Crawford she is 
entitled to cross-examine declarants at a preliminary 
hearing. However, as previously discussed, 
Crawford does not address preliminary hearings, 
and therefore, does not invalidate rule 1102. 
FN4. The 1994 amendment to Article I, 
Section 12, effective July 1, 1995, added 
the following language: 
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude 
the use of reliable hearsay evidence as 
defined by statute or rule in whole or in 
part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause at any pretrial 
proceeding with respect to release of the 
defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12. 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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FN5. Rule 1102 provides that hearsay 
evidence is admissible at the preliminary 
hearing as long as that evidence is reliable. 
See Utah R. Evid. 1102(a). The rule 
further explains that hearsay is reliable if it 
is "a statement of a declarant that is 
written, recorded, or transcribed verbatim .. 
. under oath or affirmation; or ... pursuant 
to a notification to the declarant that a false 
statement made therein is punishable." Id. 
at 1102(b)(8). 
FN6. The Supreme Court of Utah is 
constitutionally empowered to "adopt rules 
of procedure and evidence." Utah Const, 
art. I, § 4; see also Utah Code Ann. § 
78-24-4(1) (2002). 
C. Whether the Testimony Introduced at the 
Preliminary Hearing was Unreliable 
*5 H 16 Defendant further argues that Nicholls's 
testimony at the preliminary hearing, introduced via 
the transcript of his plea interview, was unreliable 
because even though it met the requirements of rule 
1102(b)(8), it was offered by a coconspirator. In 
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), the Supreme 
Court explained that statements by accomplices that 
implicate criminal defendants are inherently 
unreliable. See id. at 131-34. In light of Lilly, 
Defendant argues that "[r]ule 1102 is not and 
cannot ... be read as a list of sufficient conditions 
indicative of reliable] hearsay for the purposes of 
preliminary hearings." However, Lilly is 
inapplicable here. 
If 17 Like Crawford, Lilly was concerned solely 
with the right to confrontation at trial; it did not 
address the admissibility of hearsay at the 
preliminary hearing stage. See id . at 122-36. The 
prosecution in Lilly attempted to introduce a 
co-defendant's hearsay statements at trial without 
providing an opportunity for the defendant to 
cross-examine the declarant. See id. at 121. 
Consequently, the Court analyzed whether the 
statements at issue fell within a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception, and whether they satisfied the " 
residual 'trustworthiness' test." Id. at 131-36. The 
Court made no references to the admissibility of the 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
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statements at the preliminary hearing stage, and 
Defendant fails to provide an argument for why Lilly 
should apply here. Therefore, we are not persuaded 
by Defendant's arguments concerning Lilly. 
% 18 Furthermore, the trial court determined that 
the hearsay testimony admitted at the pretrial 
hearing met the reliability criteria of rule 1102. See 
Utah R. Evid. 1102(b)(8). We agree with that ruling 
because the statements were each "written, recorded 
or transcribed verbatim." Id. 
II. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Refusing to 
Reverse the Order of Trials 
T| 19 Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by 
proceeding with the burglary and theft trial before 
the murder trial, arguing that she was unfairly 
prejudiced. We disagree. Utah Code section 
77-8a-l(4)(a) provides, 
If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is 
prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in 
an indictment or information or by a joinder for trial 
together, the court shall order an election of 
separate trials of separate counts, grant a severance 
of defendants, or provide other relief as justice 
requires. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(4)(a) (2003). In the 
event that a severance is granted, the statute does 
not address the order of trials. To the contrary, our 
supreme court has noted that a trial court has " ' 
considerable discretion' to administer the business 
of its docket and determine how a trial should be 
conducted.' " Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 
972 P.2d 1238, 1244 (Utah 1998) (citation 
omitted); see also Morton v. Continental Baking Co 
., 938 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 1997) ("A trial judge is 
given a great deal of latitude in determining the 
most fair and efficient manner to conduct court 
business."). Consequently, when a trial court grants 
a criminal defendant's request to sever charges, the 
trial court retains considerable discretion to 
determine the order of trials, and that decision will 
not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. 
*6 K 20 However, the question of whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in scheduling trials in a 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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particular order after severance is an issue of first 
impression for our courts. The few jurisdictions 
analyzing the same question have used a balancing 
test to assess the competing interests of the State 
and the criminal defendant. See, e.g., State v. 
Walland, 555 So.2d 478, 481-82 (La.Ct.App.1989) 
(balancing the defendant's right to present a defense 
with the State's right to determine the order of 
trials); State v. Nelson, 604 A.2d 999, 1001 
(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1992) (holding that when 
two unrelated crimes are charged, evidence from 
one trial could potentially be used in a subsequent 
murder trial, and the defendant requests the murder 
trial be tried first, "the court is required to perform 
a balancing test and determine the prejudice to the 
parties in interest by the requested delay"); State v. 
Scovil, 387 A.2d 413, 416 
(NJ.Super.Ct.App.Div. 1978) ("In ordering the 
[docket after severance] there must inevitably be a 
balancing of interests."); People v. Games, 510 
N.Y.S.2d 409, 412 (N.Y.App.Div.1986) (holding 
that even though prosecutor has broad discretion to 
deteimine "prosecutorial priorities ... priority 
should be given, among others, to cases where there 
is a critical issue involving guilt or innocence, or 
the possible loss of witnesses to the rosecution or 
the defense"). But see Coe v. State, 298 S.W. 356, 
356 (Ark.1927) ("Where defendants jointly indicted 
sever, they stand in court as they would had they 
been indicted separately. If one is not ready for 
trial, or is not tried when his case is reached, the 
next in order of succession stands for trial like all 
other cases upon the criminal docket of the court."). 
We believe that this balancing test is salutary, and 
suggest that trial courts engage in this type of 
inquiry when determining the order of trials after 
severance. 
^ 21 In this instance, although the trial court did 
not explicitly engage in a balancing test, both 
parties fully briefed their respective interests and 
the court clearly considered those arguments. 
Therefore, we can legitimately assume that the trial 
court engaged in a process of balancing the parties' 
interests. Moreover, we conclude that, after 
balancing those interests, it was not an abuse of 
discretion for the court to proceed with the burglary 
and theft case prior to the murder case. 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
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Tf 22 First, Defendant argued that if the burglary 
and theft case were tried first, her right to confront 
and cross-examine the witnesses against her would 
be limited because she would be unable to expose 
the fact that the State's witness, Nicholls, had 
received immunity in exchange for his testimony. 
The State, however, responded that Nicholls was 
given immunity solely for his cooperation in the 
murder case, not with regard to the burglary and 
theft case. 
If 23 Second, Defendant argued that she would be 
prejudiced by the order of trials because the jurors 
in the burglary and theft case could potentially leam 
of and be prejudiced by their knowledge of the 
pending murder charge. However, Defendant filed a 
motion in limine to suppress all statements related 
to the murder charge, and although it is unclear 
from the record whether the court granted that 
motion, the murder charge was never mentioned 
during the burglary and theft trial. Moreover, as the 
State points out, Defendant's position was 
inconsistent. On one hand, she wanted to refer to 
the murder charge in an effort to impeach the State's 
witnesses, and on the other hand, she wanted to 
shield the jury from learning of the murder charge 
so as not to inflame prejudice. 
*7 |^ 24 Defendant next argued that if convicted of 
the burglary and theft charges, the State could use 
Defendant's convictions as aggravating 
circumstances in her murder trial. Although this 
argument may have validity, it does not hinder 
Defendant's right to a fair trial in the burglary and 
theft case. See Walland, 555 So.2d at 480-81 
(examining whether the order of trials would 
prevent the defendant from presenting exculpatory 
evidence in the first trial). The trial court had no 
reason to assume that Defendant would in fact be 
convicted of the crimes charged. And finally, the 
State was prepared to proceed with the burglary and 
theft case but was not then prepared to proceed with 
the murder case, and urged the court to consider the 
State's primary goal of expediting cases. 
1^ 25 After examining the arguments presented to 
and considered by the trial court, we conclude that 
it was within the trial court's discretion to proceed 
with the burglary and theft case prior to the murder 
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case. Our conclusion is further bolstered by the fact 
that the trial court was in the best position to assess 
the strength of the parties' arguments. See Morton v. 
Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 
1997) ("The trial judge is in the best position to 
evaluate the status of his cases, as well as the 
attitudes, motives, and credibility of the parties."); 
see also Golsun v. United States, 592 A.2d 1054, 
1058 (D.C.1991) ("We accord the trial court 
substantial deference in exercising its discretion 
because of the court's familiarity with the 
proceedings, its observations of the witnesses and 
lawyers, and its superior opportunity to get a feel 
for the case."). 
III. Whether the Trial Court Erred by Allowing 
Hearsay Statements at Trial 
K 26 Defendant argues that the trial court erred 
when it allowed Detective Bennett to present 
hearsay testimony at trial based on its conclusion 
that Defendant had opened the door to the 
testimony.™7 Although " 'it is proper to allow ... 
any testimony which would tend to dispute, explain 
or minimize the effect of evidence that has been 
given by one's opponent,' " State v. Harper, 2006 
UT App 178,U 18, 136 P.3d 1261 (quoting State v. 
Sanders, 27 Utah 2d 354, 496 P.2d 270, 274 (1972) 
), the hearsay testimony at issue in this case went 
beyond explaining Detective Bennett's responses to 
defense counsel's questions, and was therefore 
inadmissible. 
FN7. Defendant further argues that 
Detective Bennett's testimony about 
statements made by Nicholls was 
inadmissible in violation of Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
However, the Supreme Court made clear in 
Crawford that there is no Confrontation 
Clause violation when the declarant 
appears for cross-examination at trial. " 
The Confrontation Clause places no 
constraints at all on the use of ... prior 
testimonial statements.... The Clause does 
not bar admission of a statement so long as 
the declarant is present at trial to defend or 
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explain it ." Id. at 59 n. 9 (citations 
omitted). Because Nicholls testified at trial 
and was available for cross-examination, 
and did in fact testify regarding his 
statements to Detective Bennett, 
Defendant's Crawford argument fails. 
1f 27 On cross-examination, defense counsel asked 
Detective Bennett if he had spoken to anyone about 
the existence of the safe, to which he responded in 
the negative. On re-direct, the State asked Detective 
Bennett whether he had spoken to Nicholls about 
the safe. Upon answering affirmatively, the State 
asked Detective Bennett what Nicholls had said. At 
this point, the State's questioning went beyond the 
scope of cross-examination, and Detective Bennett's 
remaining testimony constituted inadmissible 
hearsay. However, we determine that the admission 
of Detective Bennett's testimony resulted in 
harmless error. 
*8 f 28 "Notwithstanding error by the trial court, 
we will not reverse a conviction if we find that the 
error was harmless." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, 
If 45, 55 P.3d 573. "An error is harmless when it is 
'sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there 
is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected 
the outcome of proceedings.' " State v. Loose, 2000 
UT 11,U 10 n. 1, 994 P.2d 1237 (quoting State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992)). Here, 
we maintain confidence in the verdict 
notwithstanding the improper admission of 
Detective Bennett's testimony. 
Tf 29 First, Davis testified about the existence of 
the safe and its disappearance. Second, Christianson 
testified that Defendant told her she had stolen a 
safe, that it contained approximately $5000, and 
that Defendant had lured the safe owner out of the 
house so Nicholls could steal the safe. Third, 
Goalen testified that Defendant told her that she had 
come into some money in the same manner the 
actors did in the film The Italian Job. Goalen 
further testified that The Italian Job, which 
Defendant and Goalen had seen together, was about 
a group of thieves that stole a safe. Finally, Goalen 
testified that Defendant said she had received some 
money from Nicholls, and that she had to drive by 
and pick up Nicholls after he stole a safe. Because 
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this testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to 
establish the existence of the stolen safe, the 
admission of Detective Bennett's testimony was 
harmless error. 
CONCLUSION 
% 30 We address three rulings challenged by 
Defendant on appeal: denial of her motion to quash 
bindover, overruling of her objection to the order of 
trials, and overruling of her objection to the use of 
hearsay evidence at trial. 
Tf 31 First, regarding the bindover order, because 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), does 
not apply at preliminary hearings, the State was 
entitled to, and did in fact, introduce reliable 
hearsay testimony in compliance with mle 1102 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. Use of hearsay at 
preliminary hearings is not prohibited by either the 
United State Constitution's Confrontation Clause or 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
Consequently, it was not error for the trial court to 
deny Defendant's motion to quash bindover. 
Second, the trial court has broad discretion to 
determine the order of trials after granting a request 
for severance, and in this instance, the trial court 
did not abuse that discretion. And finally, we hold 
that the trial court erred in admitting Detective 
Bennett's hearsay evidence at trial; however, the 
error was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm 
Defendant's convictions. 
^ 32 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS and 
CAROLYN B. McHUGH, Judges. 
UtahApp.,2006. 
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